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Abstract— In this paper, we consider the competitive diffu-
sion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks.
We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria
for two special but well-known classes of networks, namely
the lattice and the hypercube. Characterizing the utility of the
players in terms of graphical distances of their initial seed
placements to other nodes in the network, we show that in
general networks the decision process on the existence of pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium is an NP-hard problem. Following
this, we provide some necessary conditions for a given profile to
be a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we study players’ utilities
in the competitive diffusion game over Erdos-Renyi random
graphs and show that as the size of the network grows, the
utilities of the players are highly concentrated around their
expectation, and are bounded below by some threshold based
on the parameters of the network. Finally, we obtain a lower
bound for the maximum social welfare of the game with two
players, and study sub-modularity of the players’ utilities.
Index Terms— Competitive diffusion game, pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, sub-modular function, NP-hardness, Erdos-
Renyi graphs, social welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a wide range of studies
on the role of social networks in various disciplinary areas.
In particular, availability of large data from online social
networks has drawn the attention of many researchers to
model the behavior of agents in a social network using the
possible interactions among them [2], [3], [4]. One of the
widely studied models in social networks is the diffusion
model, where the goal is to propagate a certain type of
product or behavior in a desired way through the network [3],
[5], [6] and [7]. Other than applications in online advertising
for companies’ products, such a model has applications in
epidemics and immunization v.s. virus spreading [8], [9].
One of the challenges in such models has been obtaining
the solution to the best seed placement problem, which has
been extensively studied for different processes [10], [11],
[12] and [13].
In many of the applications in social networks, it is
natural to have more than one party that wants to spread
information on his own products. This imposes a sort of
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competition among the providers who are competing for the
same set of resources and their goal is to diffuse information
on their own product in a desired way across the society.
Such a competition can be modeled within a game theoretic
framework [14], and hence, a natural question one can ask
is characterization of the set of equilibria of such a game.
Several papers in the literature have in fact addressed this
question in different settings, with some representative ones
being [3], [15], [4], [16], [17] and [18]. Our goal in this
paper is to expand on this literature by addressing the issue
of complexity of ascertaining the existence of Nash equilibria
for some of these models as well as other models introduced
here, as described below.
Due to the complex nature of social events which might
be woven with rational decisions, one can find various
models aimed at capturing the idea of competition over
social networks. One of the models that describes such a
competitive behavior in networks is known as the competitive
diffusion game [19]. This model can be seen as a competition
between two or more parties (types) who initially select a
subset of nodes to invest, and the goal for each party is
to attract as many social entities to his or her own type as
possible. It was shown earlier [19] that in general such games
do not admit pure-strategy Nash equilibria. It has been shown
in [20] that such games may not even have a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium on graphs of small diameter. In fact, the
authors in [20] have shown that for graphs of diameter 2
and under some additional assumptions on the topology of
the network, the diffusion game admits a general potential
function and hence an equilibrium. However checking these
assumptions at the outset for graphs of diameter at most 2
does not seem to be realistic.
One of the advantages of the diffusion game model is
that it captures the simple fact that being closer to player’s
initial seeds will result in adopting that specific player’s
type. Moreover, the adoption rule which is involved in the
diffusion game is quite simple such that it enables each
player to compute its best response quite fast with respect to
others (at least for the case of single seed placement), given
that all the other players have fixed their actions. On the other
hand, as we will see in this paper what makes the analysis of
such games more complicated is the behavior of nodes which
are equally distanced from the players’ seeds. Although there
were some recent attempts to characterize these boundary
points and show the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium of the diffusion game over different types of networks
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[21], [22], [19], in this work we will address this issue in a
more general form, and show that finding an equilibrium
for diffusion games is an NP-hard problem over general
networks. Therefore, unless P=NP, this strongly suggests that
in general the complexity of analyzing such a diffusion game
is a hard task despite its simple adoption rule. It requires
additional relaxations in the structure of the game in order
to make it more tractable. As one possible approach one
may consider a probabilistic version of the diffusion game
using some techniques from Markov chains or optimization
of harmonic influence centrality [23], [24], [25]. However,
in this work we take a different approach by considering
the diffusion game over the well-known Erdos-Renyi random
graphs which are commonly used in the literature in order
to model social networks.
In a related recent earlier work [1], we have characterized
the utilities of the players based on the graphical distances of
various nodes from the initial seeds. In particular, we have
studied the complexity of deciding on the existence of a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Here, we characterize the
equilibria set for some classes of well-studied networks, and
explore some connections between the set of equilibria and
the underlying network structure. In particular, we provide
some necessary conditions for a given profile of strategies to
constitute a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we consider the
diffusion game over Erdos-Renyi graphs and prove some
concentration results related to utilities of the players over
such networks. Finally we provide a lower bound for the
optimal social welfare of the diffusion game over general
static networks based on their adjacency matrix.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we
describe the competitive diffusion game and review some
of its properties and existing results regarding this model.
In Section III, we determine the set of equilibria of two
special but well-studied networks, namely the lattice and the
hypercube. In Section IV, we characterize the utilities of the
agents based on the relative locations of the players’ initial
seed placements, and show that, the decision process on
the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium over general
undirected networks is an NP-hard problem. In Section V,
we provide two necessary conditions based on the network
structure for a given profile to be a Nash equilibrium. In Sec-
tion VI, we consider the diffusion game model over random
graphs and show that asymptotically the utility of the players
are highly concentrated around their mean. Furthermore, we
provide a lower bound for the expected utility of the players
based on the parameters of the random graphs. We end the
paper with the concluding remarks of Section VII. Finally, in
Appendix I, we provide some complementary results related
to sub-modularity as well as lower optimal social welfare of
the diffusion game over general fixed networks, which can
be used to obtain bounds for the price of anarchy of diffusion
games whenever an equilibrium exists.
Notations and Conventions: For a positive integer n, we
let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a vector v ∈ Rn, we let vi be the
ith entry of v. Similarly, for a matrix P , we let Pij be the ijth
entry of P and we denote the ith row of P by Pi. We denote
the transpose of a matrix P by P ′. Moreover, we let I and
1 be, respectively, the identity matrix and the column vector
of all ones of proper dimensions. Given an integer k > 0,
we denote the set of all k-tuples of integers by Zk. For any
two vectors u, v ∈ Zk, we let u ⊕ v be their sum vector in
mod 2, i.e., (u ⊕ v)i = ui + vi mod2, for all i = 1, . . . , k.
We let G = (V, E) to be an undirected graph with the set of
vertices V and the set of edges E . We denote the degree of
a vertex x in graph G by d(x). Corresponding to G we let
AG to be its adjacency matrix, i.e. AG(i, j) = 1 if and only
if (i, j) ∈ E and AG(i, j) = 0, otherwise. Given a graph
G = (V, E) and two vertices x, y ∈ V , we define dG(x, y) to
be the length of the shortest graphical path between x and
y. Also, for a set of vertices S ⊆ V and a vertex x, we let
dG(x, S) = miny∈S{dG(x, y)}. For a real number a we let
dae to be the smallest integer greater than or equal to a. We
deal in this paper with only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,
and occasionally we will drop the qualifier “pure-strategy”.
II. COMPETITIVE DIFFUSION GAME
In this section we introduce the competitive diffusion game
as was introduced earlier in [19] and state some of the
existing results for such a model. For sake of simplicity,
and without much loss of conceptual generality, we state the
model when there are only two players in the game; however,
the model and analysis can readily be extended to the case
when there are more than two players.
A. Game Model
Following the formulation in [19], we consider here a
network G of n nodes and two players (types) A and B.
Initially at time t = 0, each player decides to choose a subset
of nodes in the network and place his own seeds. After that,
a discrete time diffusion process unfolds among uninfected
nodes as follows:
• If at some time step t an uninfected node is neighbor to
infected nodes of only one type (A or B), it will adopt
that type at the next time step t+ 1.
• If an uninfected node is connected to nodes of both
types at some time step t, it will change to a gray node
at the next time step t+ 1 and does not adopt any type
afterward.
This process continues until no new adoption happens.
Finally, the utility of each player will be the total number
of infected nodes of its own type at the end of the process.
Moreover, if both players place their seeds on the same node,
that node will change to gray. We want to emphasize the fact
that when a node changes to gray, not only will it not adopt
any type at the next time step, but also may block the streams
of diffusion to other uninfected nodes. We will see later that
the existence of gray nodes in the evolution of the process
can make any prediction process about the outcome of the
diffusion process much more complicated.
Remark 1: The diffusion process as defined above is a
particular case of progressive diffusion processes, where the
state of the nodes does not change after adoption. This is in
contrast to other types of processes known as non progressive
processes [11].
Remark 2: For the case of k > 2 players, one can define
the same process as above such that an uninfected node will
adopt type i at time t + 1 if and only if type i is the only
existing type among its neighbors at time step t.
As mentioned earlier, it has been shown in [19], [22] and
[20] that competitive diffusion game may or may not admit
pure-strategy Nash equilibria depending on the topology of
the network G, and the number of the players. Moreover, it
has been shown in [21] that if the underlying graph G has a
tree structure, the diffusion game with two players admits a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In fact, for the case of three
or more players even the tree structure may not have a pure
Nash equilibrium. In the next sections we will study some
of the properties of the diffusion process over specific and
general networks and in particular some conditions which
are necessary for the existence of at least one equilibrium.
III. DIFFUSION GAME OVER SPECIFIC NETWORKS
In this section, we consider the 2-player diffusion game
with a single seed placement and study the existence of
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for two special but well-
studied classes of networks, namely the lattice and the
hypercube. Such an analysis sheds light into the problem
under more general settings, which is the topic of the next
section.
Definition 1: An m × n lattice is a graph Lm×n with
vertex set V = {(x, y) ∈ Z2 : 0 ≤ x ≤ m, 0 ≤ y ≤ n} such
that each node is adjacent to those whose Euclidean distanced
is 1 from it. A k dimensional hypercube is a graph Qk with
vertex set {0, 1}k such that two k-tuples are adjacent if and
only if they differ in exactly one position.
Proposition 1: For the 2-player diffusion game over the
lattice Lm×n,m, n ∈ Z+, a profile (a∗, b∗) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if a∗ and b∗ are adjacent nodes in
the most centric square or edges of the Lm×n.
Proof: Let us assume that a∗ = (x1, y1) and b∗ =
(x2, y2) are two nonadjacent nodes in Lm×n which form
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Without any loss of gen-
erality, and if necessary by rotating the lattice Lm×n and
relabeling the types, we can assume that x1 > x2 and
y1 ≥ y2. This situation has been shown in the Figure 1.
Now, it is not hard to see that at least one of the following
cases will happen:
• Player B can strictly increase her utility by deviating to
either (x1 − 1, y1) or (x1, y1 − 1).
• Player A can strictly increase her utility by deviating to
either (x2 + 1, y2) or (x2, y2 + 1).
Therefore, in any of these cases, it means that (a∗, b∗) cannot
be an equilibrium. Moreover, if two adjacent nodes are not
in the most centric part of the lattice, it can be seen that one
of the players can always increase her utility by deviating
to another neighbor of the other player while moves closer
to the center of the lattice. This shows that if a profile is a
Nash equilibrium it must be two adjacent nodes in the most
centric square of the lattice Lm×n. Finally, using the same
line of argument as above, it is not hard to see that in every
such profile each of the players will obtain the maximum
utility that she can get, given that the position of the other
player is fixed. This shows that indeed any adjacent profile
in the most centric square is a Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 1. Illustration of Lattice in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2: A profile (a∗, b∗) is a Nash equilibrium of
the 2-player diffusion game over the hypercube Qk if and
only if the graphical distance between a∗ and b∗ is an odd
number, or equivalently (a∗ ⊕ b∗)′1k = 1 mod 2.
Proof: First, we note that if (a∗ ⊕ b∗)′1k = 1 mod 2,
then UA(a∗, b∗) = UB(a∗, b∗) = 2k−1, where UA(a∗, b∗)
and UB(a∗, b∗) denote, respectively, the utilities of players
A and B given that their initial seeds are at a∗ and b∗. In
this case, there exists no vertex v which has equal graphical
distance to both a∗ and b∗, otherwise, if d(a∗, v) = d(b∗, v),
it means that (a∗ ⊕ v)′1 = (b∗ ⊕ v)′1. Therefore, (a∗ ⊕
b∗)′1 = (a∗ ⊕ v)′1 + (b∗ ⊕ v)′1 = 0 mod2, which is in
contradiction with the assumption. Therefore, using Lemma
1, every node of Qk must adopt either type A or B. Finally,
for every node v such that d(a∗, v) < d(b∗, v), one can assign
a unique node u = v ⊕ (a∗ ⊕ b∗), such that d(b∗, u) <
d(a∗, u). This one-to-one bijection shows that UA(a∗, b∗) =
UB(a
∗, b∗) = |V (Qk)|2 = 2
k−1.
To show that every such profile is indeed a pure Nash
equilibrium, we show that for every arbitrary profile, the
maximum utility that each player can gain is at most 2k−1.
We show it by induction on k. For k = 1, the result is trivial.
Assuming that the statement is true for k− 1, let (a∗, b∗) be
an arbitrary pair of nodes in Qk. We consider two cases:
• a∗ ⊕ b∗ = 1k. In this case a∗ and b∗ are binary
complimentary of each other (by a simple translation of
each node by the binary vector a∗ and without any loss
of generality we may assume a∗ = 0 and b∗ = 1k).
Therefore, by symmetry of Qk, it is not hard to see
that UA(a∗, b∗) = UB(a∗, b∗). Since the total utility is
at most 2k, thus we have UA(a∗, b∗) = UB(a∗, b∗) ≤
2k−1. Such a situation for the case of k = 3 is illustrated
in Figure 2.
• a∗⊕b∗ 6= 1k. In this case, there exists at least one coor-
dinate such that a∗ and b∗ agree on it. Without any loss
of generality, let us assume a∗i = b
∗
i and let Q = {x ∈
V (Qk) : xi = a
∗
i } and Qc = V (Qk)\Q. Therefore, it is
not hard to see that the induced subgraphs by vertices
Q and Qc are hypercubes of dimension k − 1 which
are connected to each other through a perfect matching
(a set of disjoint edges which connect all the nodes
in pairs). Furthermore, a∗ and b∗ are both located in
Q. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, the utility of
the players on Q, i.e., UQA (a
∗, b∗), UQB (a
∗, b∗) is at most
2k−2. Moreover, since Q and Qc are connected through
a perfect matching and there is only one step delay
in the diffusion process between Q and Qc, hence the
adoption of vertices in Qc is exactly the same as those
in Q. Therefore, we have UA(a∗, b∗) = 2U
Q
A (a
∗, b∗) ≤
2× 2k−2 = 2k−1, and similarly UB(a∗, b∗) ≤ 2k−1.
Overall, we have shown that a profile (a∗, b∗) in Qk is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if UA(a∗, b∗) = UB(a∗, b∗) =
2k−1, which happens if and only if a∗ and b∗ have an odd
graphical distance from each other, or equivalently (a∗ ⊕
b∗)′1k = 1 mod 2.
Fig. 2. A Nash equilibrium of the diffusion game over 3-dimensional
hypercube. The circled nodes denote the initial seeds and the figure
illustrates the final state of the game.
IV. NP-HARDNESS OF MAKING A DECISION ON
EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we first characterize the final state of the
diffusion process based on relative distances of the players’
initial seed placements on the network. Using this characteri-
zation we establish a hardness result for the decision process
on the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the
diffusion game.
Lemma 1: Let NA and NB denote the set of nodes which
adopt, respectively, types A and B at the end of the process
for a particular initial selection of seeds a, b ∈ V . Moreover,
let N be the set of gray or uninfected (white) nodes by the
end of the process. Then,
N ⊆ {i : dG(a, i) = dG(b, i)},
{i : dG(a, i)<dG(b, i)}⊆NA⊆{i : dG(a, i)≤dG(b, i)},
{i : dG(b, i)<dG(a, i)}⊆NB⊆{i : dG(b, i)≤dG(a, i)}.
Proof: Here we only sketch the steps of the proof and
refer readers to [1] for the complete proof. The proof is by
induction on the time step t = 0, 1, . . .. Assuming that the
statement of the Lemma is true for all the gray nodes such
that they are born at steps t ≤ k, by considering different
possibilities as to why a new node will change to gray at
the next time step, one can show that this can happen only
if the new node has the same graphical distance to the seed
nodes. A similar argument shows that uninfected nodes can
be reached from the seed nodes only by passing through
some gray nodes, and hence, they must lie within the same
graphical distance of the seed nodes.
Note that in Lemma 1 we assumed that each player can
only place one seed in the network as its initial placement.
However, the result can be easily generalized to the case
when each player (for example player A) is allowed to
choose a set of nodes SA ⊂ V as its initial seed placements.
In this case we just need to replace dG(SA, x) instead of
dG(a, x) in the statement of Lemma 1 and all the other results
carry naturally. Moreover, a similar result can be proved
when there are more than two players in the game.
As it was shown before in [19] and [20], one can always
construct networks with diameter greater than or equal to
2 such that the diffusion game over such networks does not
admit any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In fact, by a closer
look at Lemma 1, one can see that there is some similarity be-
tween Voronoi games [26] and competitive diffusion games.
Note, however, that in the competitive diffusion game a
diffusion process unfolds while there is no notion of diffusion
in Voronoi games. However, since at the end of the process
both games demonstrate behavior close to each other, it
seems natural to compare the complexity of Nash equilibria
in these two games. In fact, in the following we show
that the decision on the existence of Nash equilibrium in a
diffusion game is NP-hard. Toward that goal, we first prove
some relevant results and modify the configuration of the
diffusion game to make a connection with Voronoi games.
Borrowing some of the existing results from the Voronoi
games literature, we prove the NP-hardness of verification
of existence of Nash equlibrium in the diffusion game. We
prove it by reduction from the 3-partitioning problem which
is shown to be an NP-complete problem [27]. In the 3-
partitioning problem, we are given integers α1, α2, . . . , α3m
and a β such that β4 < αi <
β
2 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m,∑3m
i=1 αi = mβ and have to partition them into disjoint sets
P1, . . . , Pm ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 3m} such that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m
we have
∑
i∈Pj αi = β.
First, we briefly describe the stages that we will go through
toward proving the NP-hardness of making a decision on the
existence of a Nash Equilibrium. Given an arbitrary network
G, by adding extra nodes and edges properly we expand this
network into a new network G¯ such that we make sure that
if there exists a Nash equilibrium in the original network, it
must lie within a confined subset of nodes in the extended
network G¯ (Lemma 2). This allows us to confine our attention
to only a specific subset of nodes in the extended network in
order to search for a Nash equilibrium. Following this, we
construct a new network (Theorem 3) such that any Nash
equilibrium of the game is equivalent to a solution of the 3-
partitioning problem which is known to be an NP-complete
problem. This establishes the NP-hardness of arriving at
a decision on the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the
diffusion game. We begin a formal proof of the result by
stating the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Let T be a subset of V (G). Then, there exists
an extended graph G¯ such that there is a bijection between the
Nash equilibria in G where the seeds (actions of the players)
are restricted to T , and the unrestricted Nash equilibria in G¯.
Proof: Consider the graph G¯ depicted in Figure 3,
which is constructed using G by adding |T |n new nodes and
n |T |(|T |+1)2 new edges. Note that |T | denotes the number of
the nodes in T and n = 2|V (G)| + 1 is a positive integer.
It is important to note here that although n > |V (G)|, it is
polynomially bounded above by |V (G)|. With each node i ∈
T we associate a set of n new nodes Ci = {ci1, ci2, . . . , cin}
and we connect all of them to node i. Furthermore, for
j = 1, . . . , n, we connect all the nodes c1j , . . . , c|T |j to each
other. In other words, nodes {c1j , . . . , c|T |j} form a clique
for each j = 1, . . . , n.
Fig. 3. Extension of graph G to G¯
Now assume that at least one player puts his node seed in
k ∈ T . We refer to this player as the first player and denote
its type by A. We claim that all the other players must play in
T as well. To prove this, suppose that another player which
we refer to as the second player with corresponding type B
chooses node ` ∈ T, ` 6= k. In this case he will earn at least
n due to winning all the nodes in C`. Now let us assume
that the second player plays in the bottom part of the graph
(Figure 3), i.e. L = ∪|T |i=1Ci. We consider two cases:
1. He plays in Ck and without any loss of generality and
by symmetry, we may assume that he plays in ck1.
2. He plays in C` for some ` 6= k such as c`1.
In the first case and after the first step of diffusion, all
the elements c11, c21, . . . , c|T |1 will adopt type of the second
player, i.e. B (because there is a direct link between them and
ck1), and all the elements ck2, ck3, . . . , ckn will adapt type
of the first player, i.e. A. At the second time step, the second
player can adopt all the elements of T \{k} in the best case.
On the other hand, all the elements of L\{c11, c21, . . . , c|T |1}
will change to A. Therefore, in this case the second player
can gain at most |T |+ |V (G)| ≤ 2|V (G)| < n.
In the second case and after the first step of diffusion,
the second player can adopt only {c11, c21, . . . , c|T |1, `} \
{ck1} while the first player will adopt at least {ck2, . . . , ckn},
(note that node ck1 will change to gray). However, at the
second time step all the nodes in C` \ {c`1} and also in
L \ {Ck ∪ C` ∪ {c11, c21, . . . , c|T |1}} will change to type
A. Therefore, in this case, the second player gains at most
|T |+ |V (G)| ≤ 2|V (G)| < n.
Furthermore, if the second player places his seed at a node
in V (G) \ T , then in the best scenario it will take at least
two steps for the seed to be diffused to nodes of L. On the
other hand, type A can be diffused through every node of
L in no more than 2 steps. Thus all the nodes in L either
adopt A or they change to gray and hence, in this case the
second player can not earn more than V (G)− 1 < n. From
the above discussion it should be clear that in either of the
above cases, if a player is playing in L ∪ V (G) \ T he can
always gain more by deviating to the set T . Thus in each
equilibrium players must put their seeds in T .
Finally suppose that Q¯ is a Nash equilibrium profile in G¯.
By the above argument we know that all the players must
play in T and thus, each of these players gains exactly n
from the set L. Therefore, the utility of players is equal to
the utility that they would gain by playing on G plus n.
This shows that Q¯ must be an equilibrium for G when the
strategies of players are restricted to T . Similarly, if Q is an
equilibrium of G when the strategies of players are restricted
to T , it is also an equilibrium for G¯ as we know all the
equilibria seeds of players (if there is any) must be in T .
This shows that the set of equilibria of G¯ is equivalent to the
set of equilibria of G with the restricted strategy set T .
Theorem 3: Given a graph G and m ≥ 2 players, the
decision process on the existence of pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium for the diffusion game on G is NP-hard.
Proof: Assume that integers α1, α2, . . . , α3m and β >
3 are given such that β4 < αi <
β
2 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m,∑3m
i=1 αi = mβ. Moreover, let c =
(
3m
3
)
and choose an
integer d such that (β−1)c4 < d <
βc
4 . Consider the graph
depicted in Figure 4, where the set T is defined to be the set
of vertices whose induced subgraph G[T ] is illustrated in the
dashed-line area. In fact, such a graph is composed of three
parts:
• The right graph: This is a graph of 9d nodes, composed
of 9 stars of size d where the centers of the stars are
connected as it is shown in Figure 4. It has been shown
in [20] that this graph does not admit any pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium when there are two agents. In fact,
if there is only one player on this graph, he will gain
9d and if there are two players on it, one of them can
always deviate to gain at least 4d.
• The middle graph: This graph is simply a clique of
size
(
3m
3
)
where the nodes are labeled by ui,j,k for all
possible triples {i, j, k}, i, j, k ∈ [3m].
• The left graph: This graph is composed of 3m inde-
pendent sets (i.e., there exists no edge between vertices
of each set) I1, . . . , I3m of sizes cα1, . . . , cα3m, re-
spectively, such that all the nodes in the independent
sets Ii, Ij , and Ik are connected to node ui,j,k in the
middle graph.
Fig. 4. Graph construction of Theorem 3
Calling the graph in Figure 4 G, setting T to be the
set of vertices of the middle and right side graphs, and
applying Lemma 2 to construct G¯, we can see that any Nash
equilibrium of G¯ is an equilibrium of G when the strategies of
players are restricted to T . We claim that Q is an equilibrium
for G with the restricted strategy set T (and equivalently an
equilibrium for unrestricted G¯) if and only if there is a 3-
partitioning of {αi}3mi=1.
Assume that there is a solution P1, . . . , Pm to the 3-
partition. For every 1 ≤ q ≤ m, if Pq = {i, j, k}, then
player q is assigned to ui,j,k. Let also assume that player
m + 1 is assigned to one of the nodes in the most right
part of the graph, which makes his utility to be 9d. If
player m + 1 moves to a vertex ui,j,k his utility will be
1 < 9d, because all the other m players already covered
all the
∑3m
`=1 ca` nodes in the most left side of the graph
and his movement will not result in any additional payoff
for him except producing some gray nodes. Now if one of
the players 1 ≤ q ≤ m moves from vertex ui,j,k to one of
the nodes in the right part of the graph, then his gain can
be at most 4d which by the selection of d would be less
than what he was getting before (βc). Finally, If player q
or equivalently node ui,j,k moves to another node ui′,j′,k′
for some {i′, j′, k′} 6= {i, j, k} then since Pq was part of
3-partitioning before, it means that his payoff after deviating
will be at most cmax{αi + αj , αi + αk, αj + αk} < cβ.
Moreover, by Lemma 2 no player at equilibrium will be out
of T and hence the proposed profile using the 3-partitioning
is an equilibrium.
Now let us suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium for
G¯. We show that it corresponds to a solution of 3-partitioning.
First we note that there cannot be two players in the most
right part of the graph, otherwise it is not an equilibrium by
[20]. Moreover, if there are 3 players or more, one of them
can gain at most 3d. Since in this case there are at most m−2
players in the middle part, we can find a set {i′, j′, k′} such
that the corresponding set of all the other players does not
have any intersection with it. Therefore, if a player with the
least gain (at most 3d) from the right side deviates to ui′,j′,k′
in the middle part, he will gain at least 3βc4 which is greater
than 3d. Thus the most right part can have either one player
or nothing. However since 9d > 3βc2 , at least one player
would want to move to the most right part of the graph if
there is no other player there. Therefore, the most right part
of the graph has exactly one player. Thus, the rest of the
m players must not only play in T (because of Lemma 2)
but also they must form a partition. Otherwise one of them
can move to an appropriate vertex of the middle graph and
increase his utility. Finally, in this partitioning, each player
must gain exactly βc, because if this is not true and one of
the players namely ui,j,k gets less than βc, he will gain at
most (β − 1)c (note that c is a rescaling factor) and thus,
he can always move to the most right side of the graph and
gain 4d > (β − 1)c. Thus this partitioning must be a 3-
partitioning. This proves the equivalence of the existence of
Nash equilibrium in G¯ and existence of 3-partitioning for the
set {αi}3mi=1.
V. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN
COMPETITIVE DIFFUSION GAME
In this section, we consider the 2-player diffusion game
with a single seed placement, present some necessary con-
ditions for existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and
discuss its connection with the network structure. Here, it is
worth noting that although the results of this section provide
some necessary conditions for a given profile to be a Nash
equilibrium, in general they do not guarantee the existence
of a Nash equilibrium, that is they are not sufficient. We
start with the following theorem which is for the case of
two players; however, it can be extended quite naturally to
the case of an arbitrary number of players.
Theorem 4: Suppose that (a∗, b∗) ∈ V × V is an equilib-
rium profile for the diffusion game. Then,
d n−1
d(a∗)
e ≤ UB(a∗, b∗), d n−1
d(b∗)
e ≤ UA(a∗, b∗),
where UA(a∗, b∗) and UB(a∗, b∗) denote the utilities of
players A and B given the initial seed placement at (a∗, b∗),
and d(a∗) and d(b∗) denote, respectively, the degrees of
nodes a∗ and b∗ in the network G.
Proof: Assume that player A and B place their seeds
at nodes a∗ and b∗ and receive payoffs of UA(a∗, b∗)
and UB(a∗, b∗), respectively. We claim that there exists a
neighbor of a∗ where player b∗ can gain at least d n−1d(a∗)e by
deviating to it. Toward showing this, let us also denote all
the neighbors of a∗ by v1, v2, . . . , vd(a∗). Let us denote the
nodes that adopt B for the initial seed allocation (a∗, vi) by
Si, i = 1, 2, . . . ,d(a
∗). Then, we have ∪d(a∗)i=1 Si = V \{a∗}.
In fact, for every v ∈ V \ {a∗}, the shortest path from v
to a∗ must pass through at least one of the neighbors of
a∗ such as v`. This means that dG(v, v`) < dG(v, a∗) and
using Lemma 1 we can see that v ∈ S`. Therefore we have
n − 1 = | ∪d(a∗)i=1 Si| ≤
∑d(a∗)
i=1 |Si| and this means that
there exists at least one vi∗ such that |Si∗ | ≥ d |V \{a
∗}|
d(a∗) e =
d n−1d(a∗)e. Since we assumed that (a∗, b∗) is an equilibrium,
player b∗ can not gain more by deviating to vi∗ . This means
that d n−1d(a∗)e ≤ UB(a∗, b∗) and using the same argument for
the other player we get d n−1d(b)e ≤ UA(a∗, b∗).
Note that the results in Theorem 4 can be improved by
noting that the inequality | ∪d(a∗)i=1 Si| ≤
∑d(a∗)
i=1 |Si| can be
strict and there are nodes which might be counted in different
sets of Si. In fact, it is not hard to see that if a node v
belongs to two of these sets such as Sj and Sk, v must be
in an even cycle emanating a∗ and including the nodes vj
and vk. In such a case, to every cycle of even length which
includes a∗ and does not contain another smaller cycle, one
can associate a node which is counted twice in two different
sets. We call such cycles simple even cycles emanating from
a∗. Therefore, we can write
n− 1 = | ∪d(a∗)i=1 Si|
≤
d(a∗)∑
i=1
|Si|−{Simple even cycles emanating from a∗}|,
and therefore the bound in the Theorem 4 will change to
⌈n−1+|{Simple even cycles emanating from a∗}|
d(a∗)
⌉
≤UB(a∗, b∗).
Next, we consider the following two definitions from
graph theory.
Definition 2: An edge (a vertex) of a connected graph G is
a cut-edge (cut-vertex) if its removal disconnects the graph.
Definition 3: A block of a graph G is a maximal connected
subgraph of G that has no cut-vertex.
Remark 3: Two blocks in a graph share at most one
vertex. Hence the blocks of a graph partition its edge set.
Furthermore, a vertex shared by two blocks must be a cut-
vertex.
Theorem 5: Every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a 2-
player diffusion game must lie within one of the blocks of
its underlying network.
Proof: Given a network G = (V, E) with block
decomposition B1,B2, . . . ,Bk, let us denote one of the pure-
strategy Nash equilibria of the diffusion game on G by
(a∗, b∗) ∈ V × V . If a∗, b∗ ∈ Bi, for some i ∈ [k], then
there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, without any loss of
generality, let us assume that a∗ ∈ B1 and b∗ ∈ B2. Starting
from node a∗ and moving along a shortest path P between
a∗ and b∗, the path must exit block B1 for the first time at
some vertex v1. Clearly by Remark 3 such a vertex must
be a cut vertex since it is shared between two blocks. By a
similar argument, but this time by starting from node b∗ and
moving along the path P we can see that the path P must
exit block B2 through a cut vertex v2. Next we consider two
cases:
• v1 = v2 := v. In this case, we can assume that neither
a∗ = v nor b∗ = v, otherwise (a∗, b∗) would already be
an equilibrium within one block (either B1 or B2). Now,
without any loss of generality let us assume that the
vertex v does not adopt type A for the seed placement
(a∗, b∗). Then, the first player can strictly increase its
utility by removing its seed from a∗ and placing it
in node v. In fact, placing the initial seeds on (v, b∗)
instead of (a∗, b∗), the first player not only can adopt all
the nodes that he was able to adopt in (a∗, b∗) (this is
due to the fact that there is no edge between vertices of
two distinct blocks (Remark 3)), but also he can adopt
at least one more new node, which is node v. This is in
contrast with (a∗, b∗) being a Nash equilibrium. Hence
(a∗, b∗) must lie within one block.
• v1 6= v2. In this case, by the definition of the cut vertices
v1 and v2 we clearly have dG(a∗, v1) < dG(a∗, v2), and
dG(b∗, v2) < dG(b∗, v1) (Figure 5). Now, if v2 adopts
type A, by Lemma 1 it is straightforward to see that v1
adopts type A as well. But then by the same argument
as in the first case, the second player can move its seed
from b∗ to v1 and strictly increase its utility. On the
other hand, if v2 does not adopt type A, then the first
player can move its seed from a∗ to v2, and strictly
increase its utility. This is in contradiction with (a∗, b∗)
being a Nash equilibrium, and hence (a∗, b∗) must lie
within one block.
Fig. 5. Illustration of block diagrams in Theorem 5.
We note that Theorem 5 breaks down the complication
of search of a Nash equilibrium over the entire graph to
only its blocks. We further note that there are efficient time
algorithms which can decompose a graph into its blocks in
at most O(n2) steps, where n is the number of the nodes in
the graph [28].
VI. DIFFUSION GAME OVER RANDOM GRAPHS
Social networks that are observed in the real world, can
be viewed as a single realization of an underlying stochastic
process. This line of thinking has generated a huge interest in
modeling real world social networks using random networks,
which are highly structured while being essentially random.
This is in fact a property which emerges in many real
world social networks. One of the most well-known random
structures in this context is the Erdos-Renyi graph G(n, p),
where there are n nodes and the edges emerge independently
with probability p ∈ (0, 1).
In this section we consider a two player diffusion game
with single seed placement over the Erdos-Renyi graph
G(n, p). It is a well-known fact [29] that p(n) = lnnn is a
threshold function for the connectivity of the random graph
G(n, p). In particular, for p ≥ lnnn , almost surely there
does not exist any isolated vertex in G(n, p), as n → ∞.
On the other hand, it was shown earlier [29], [19], that
p(n) =
√
2 lnn
n is a threshold function for having diameter
2 in G(n, p). In particular, for p(n) ≥
√
c lnn
n , c > 2 almost
all the nodes in G(n, p) lie withing graphical distance of
at most 2 from each other, which results in some straight
forward analysis of the diffusion game over such graphs.
Therefore, in this section we confine our attention to the
more interesting region where p ∈ ( lnnn ,
√
2 lnn
n ).
For any arbitrary but fixed node x and any realization G of
G(n, p), we let SG(i) and BG(i) be the set of all the nodes
which are, respectively, at graphical distances of exactly i,
and at most i from node x. Similarly, we define S(i) and
B(i) be two random sets denoting, respectively, the set of
nodes of distances exactly i, and at most i from node x
when the underlying graph is a random graph G(n, p). Now
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For an arbitrary λ > (n− 1)p, and any i ∈ [n]
we have
P(|S(i)| ≥ λ|B(i− 1)|) ≤ ne− (λ−(n−1)p)
2
3(n−1)p .
Proof:
P
(
|S(i)| ≥ λ|B(i− 1)|
)
= P
( |S(i)|
|B(i− 1)| ≥ λ
)
≤ P
(
∃v ∈ B(i− 1) : d(v) ≥ λ
)
≤ P
(
∃v : d(v) ≥ λ
)
≤ nP(d(v)≥λ) = nP
(
d(u)−(n−1)p ≥ λ−(n−1)p
)
≤ ne− (λ−(n−1)p)
2
3(n−1)p ,
where in the first inequality we have used the fact that every
node in S(i) must be connected to at least one vertex in
B(i−1). Therefore, there exists at least one vertex in B(i−1)
whose degree is greater than or equal to |S(i)||B(i−1)| . Finally,
in the last inequality we have used the Chernoff bound for
the random variable d(v). Note that d(v) is the sum of
(n − 1) independent Bernoulli random variables with equal
probability of occurrence p.
Next we consider the following definition.
Definition 4: A martingale is a sequence X0, X1, . . . , Xm
of random variables, where for 0 ≤ i < m, we have
E[Xi+1|Xi, Xi−1, . . . , X0] = Xi. It is easy to see that
if X0, X1, . . . , Xm is a martingale, then µ := X0 =
E[Xi],∀i = 1, 2 . . . ,m.
Lemma 4: [Azuma’s Inequality [30]] Let µ =
X0, X1, . . . , Xm be a martingale with |Xi+1 −Xi| ≤ 1 for
all 0 ≤ i < m. Then
P
(
|Xm − µ| >
√
mθ
)
≤ 2e− θ
2
2 .
Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 6: For any arbitrary constant α ∈ (0, 1), let p ∈
[ lnnn ,
√
lnn
n1+α ]. Then, as n → ∞, for every random seed
placement in the 2-player diffusion game over G(n, p) with
single seed, we have E[UA] = E[UB ] ≥ 15p . Moreover, as
n→∞ almost surely we have UAE[UA] = UBE[UB ] → 1.
Proof: For an arbitrary but fixed node x, let I(x) be the
event that in the random graph G(n, p) with uniform seed
placements at (a, b) ∈ V × V , node x gets infected (adopts
either of the two types), and we denote its complement by
Ic(x). Conditioning on the graph G(n, p) = G, we can write
P(I(x)|G(n, p) = G) ≥
∑
i 6=j |SG(i)||SG(j)|
n2
P(Ic(x)|G(n, p) = G) ≤
∑n
i=1 |SG(i)|2
n2
, (1)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that if the seed
nodes lie in different sets SG(i), SG(i), i 6= j from node
x, then by Lemma 1 node x will adopt one of the types.
Moreover, for the second inequality and using Lemma 1,
one can see that the set of uninfected or gray nodes is a
subset of vertices which are within equal distance from the
seed nodes.
Now let us define the following sets of graphs;
K = {G : dG(v) > 0,∀v}
F = {G : |SG(i)| < λ|BG(i− 1)|,∀i ∈ [n]}.
By combining the two inequalities in (1) and taking the
average over the probability space of all possible graphs with
distribution G(n, p), we can write
P(Ic(x))
P(I(x))
=
∑
G P(G)P(Ic(x)|G(n, p) = G)∑
G P(G)P(I(x)|G(n, p) = G)
≤
∑
G P(G)
(∑n
i=1 |SG(i)|2
)∑
G P(G)
(∑
i 6=j |SG(i)||SG(j)|
)
=
∑
G∈F
P(G)
(
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2
)
+
∑
G∈Fc
P(G)
(
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2
)
∑
G
P(G)
(∑
i6=j
|SG(i)||SG(j)|
)
≤
∑
G∈F
P(G)
(
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2
)
+ n2P
(
G ∈ Fc
)
∑
G∈F
P(G)
(∑
i 6=j
|SG(i)||SG(j)|
) , (2)
where the second inequality holds because
∑n
i=1 |SG(i)|2 ≤
n2. On the other hand, we have∑
i6=j
|SG(i)||SG(j)| = 2
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|
∑
j≤i−1
|SG(j)|
= 2
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)||BG(i− 1)|. (3)
Using (3) in (2) we can write.
P(Ic(x))
P(I(x))
≤
∑
G∈F
P(G)
(
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2
)
+ n2P
(
G ∈ Fc
)
2
∑
G∈F
P(G)
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)||BG(i− 1)|
≤
∑
G∈F
P(G)
(
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2
)
+ n2P
(
G ∈ Fc
)
2
λ
∑
G∈F
P(G)
(
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2
)
=
λ
2
+
n2λ
2
P
(
G ∈ Fc
)
∑
G∈F
P(G)
(
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2
)
≤ λ
2
+
n2λ
2
P
(
G ∈ Fc
)
∑
G∈F∩K
P(G)
(
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2
)
≤ λ
2
+
n2λ
2
P
(
G ∈ Fc
)
P
(
G ∈ F ∩ K
) ,
(4)
where in the second inequality we have used the definition of
set F , and in the last inequality we have used the definition
of K to get
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2 ≥ 1,∀G ∈ F∩K. On the other hand,
by Lemma 3 and using the union bound, we can write,
P(G ∈ Fc) = P(∃i ∈ [n] : |S(i)| ≥ λ|B(i− 1)|)
≤
n∑
i
P(|S(i)| ≥ λ|B(i− 1)|)
≤ n2e− (λ−(n−1)p)
2
3(n−1)p . (5)
By choosing λ = (1+
√
15)np for sufficiently large n, and
using (5), each of the probabilities P(G ∈ F) and P(G ∈ K)
can be made arbitrarily close to 1. Therefore, for sufficiently
large n, we have P(G ∈ F ∩K) ≥ 12 . Hence, substituting (5)
in (4) and using P(G ∈ F ∩ K) ≥ 12 , we get
P(Ic(x))
P(I(x))
≤ λ
2
+ λn4e−
(λ−(n−1)p)2
3(n−1)p
=
1+
√
15
2
np+(1+
√
15)n5pe−
((1+
√
15)np−(n−1)p)2
3(n−1)p
≤ 1 +
√
15
2
np+ (1 +
√
15)n5pe−
15 lnn
3
=
1 +
√
15
2
np+ (1 +
√
15)p,
where the second inequality holds because p ≥ lnnn . Fi-
nally, since P(Ic(x)) = 1 − P(I(x)), we get P(I(x)) ≥
2
2+(2+2
√
15)p+(1+
√
15)np
. Now because of the symmetry be-
tween players we can write,
E[UA] = E[UB ] =
1
2
E[UA + UB ] =
1
2
∑
x
P (I(x))
≥ n
2 + (2 + 2
√
15)p+ (1 +
√
15)np
.
Therefore, for sufficiently large n, we have E[UA] ≥ 15p .
Now for two arbitrary but fixed nodes a and b, let
us assume that players A and B place their seeds at a
and b, respectively. We introduce a martingale by setting
X0 = E[UA(a, b)], and Xi = E[UA(a, b)|v1 = a, v2 =
b, v3, v4, . . . , vi] to be the expected utility of player A after
the first i nodes of the random graph G(n, p) are exposed.
In other words, to find Xi we expose the first i vertices and
all their internal edges and take the conditional expectation
of UA with that partial information. It is straight forward
to check that this defines a martingale of length at most n
such that |Xi+1−Xi| ≤ 1, as adding one vertex can at most
change the utility of player A by at most 1. Therefore, using
Azumas’ inequality (Lemma 4) we can write
P
(
|UA − E[UA]| ≥
√
nθ
)
≤ 2e− θ
2
2 .
In particular, since E[UA] ≥ 15p , we can write
P
( ∣∣∣∣ UAE[UA] − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 5p√nθ)
≤ P
( ∣∣∣∣ UAE[UA] − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≥ √nθE[UA]
)
≤ 2e− θ
2
2 .
By choosing θ = lnn and since p ∈ ( lnnn ,
√
lnn
n1+α ), one can
see that for any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large n()
such that for n ≥ n(), we have P
( ∣∣∣ UAE[UA] − 1∣∣∣ ≥ ) ≤ .
By the same argument and by symmetry, we can see that
for sufficiently large n, UB is arbitrarily close to its mean.
Since E[UB ] = E[UA], we can write,
P
(∣∣∣∣ UAE[UA]−1
∣∣∣∣<, ∣∣∣∣ UBE[UB ]−1
∣∣∣∣<)
=1−P
(∣∣∣∣ UAE[UA]−1
∣∣∣∣≥, or ∣∣∣∣ UBE[UB ]−1
∣∣∣∣≥)
≥ 1− P
(∣∣∣∣ UAE[UA]−1
∣∣∣∣≥)−P(∣∣∣∣ UBE[UB ]−1
∣∣∣∣≥)
≥ 1− 2.
This completes the proof.
As we close this section, we stress the fact that the subset
of nodes which adopt either of the two types in diffusion
games can be viewed as a community whose members have
closer interactions with each other. In other words, in the
diffusion game each community can be viewed as the final
subset of nodes that adopt a specific technology, which raises
the question of efficient decomposition of the network into
different communities. In such problems, the main issue is
to partition the set of nodes into different groups such that
the set of edges within each group is much larger than
that between the groups. Different approaches in order to
determine the communities effectively so that they scale with
the parameters of the network under both deterministic and
randomized setting have been proposed in the literature [31],
[32]. As an example, an electrical voltage-based approach in
order to determine the communities within a network such
that they scale linearly with the size of the network has been
discussed in [33].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied a class of games known as
diffusion games which model the competitive behavior of a
set of social actors on an undirected connected social net-
work. We determined the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria
for two special but well-studied classes of networks. We
showed that, in general, making a decision on the existence
of Nash equilibrium for such a class of games is an NP-
hard problem. Further, we have presented some necessary
conditions for a given profile to be an equilibrium in general
graphs. Finally, we have studied the behavior of the com-
petitive diffusion game over Erdos-Renyi graphs, obtained
some concentration results, and derived lower bounds for the
expected utilities of the players over such random structures.
As a future direction of research, an interesting problem is
identifying the class of networks which admit Nash equilibria
for the case of two players in the competitive diffusion game.
It is not hard to see that a tree construction which is a special
case of bipartite graphs always leads to a pure-strategy
equilibrium [21] for the case of two players. Finally, studying
a more robust model of the diffusion games with respect
to changes in the network topology is another important
problem.
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APPENDIX I
SOCIAL WELFARE AND SUB-MODULARITY IN THE
COMPETITIVE DIFFUSION GAME
In this appendix we first study the maximum social welfare
of the game which can be achieved by both players in the
competitive diffusion game with a single seed placement.
The motivation for such a study is that any bound which is
obtained for the optimal social welfare can be used to provide
some bound on the price of anarchy of the game, which
measures the degradation in the efficiency of a system due
to selfish behavior of its agents, and is defined to be the ratio
of the centralized optimal social welfare over the sum utilities
of the worst equilibrium. Following that, we study the sub-
modular property in the competitive diffusion game. It was
shown in the literature that greedy algorithm optimization
approaches work quite well for the dynamics which benefit
from sub-modular property [35]. In this appendix we show
that unlike some other diffusion processes [7], the utilities
of the players in the competitive diffusion game do not have
the sub-modular property.
We start with the following definition:
Definition 5: Given an arbitrary nonnegative matrix P , we
define its zero pattern σ(P ) to be
σ(P )ij =
{
1, Pij > 0
0, Pij = 0.
Theorem 7: Given a graph G = (V, E) of n nodes and
diameter D, and two players A and B, there exists an initial
seed placement (a, b) for players such that the social utility
UA(a, b) + UB(a, b) is at least
n+ 1−
∑D
k=1
∥∥(σ(Ak)− σ(Ak−1))1∥∥2
n(n− 1) ,
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the standard Euclidean norm, and A =
I+AG where AG is the adjacency matrix of the network G.
Proof: Let us define G(k) = (V, E(k)), where E(k) =
{(i, j)|dG(i, j) = k}. We consider all the initial placements
over different pairs of nodes, and then compute the average
utility gained by players. To do that, we consider an array
Q of
(
n
2
)
rows and n different columns. For i 6= j, k ∈
{1, 2, . . . n}, we let Q({i, j}, k) = 1 if and only if node
k adopts either A or B during the diffusion process for
the initial placement {i, j}, and Q({i, j}, k) = 0, otherwise
(Figure 6). We count the maximum number of zeros in Q.
For an arbitrary but fixed node x ∈ V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, we
count the number of different initial seed placements which
result in node x turning to gray. In other words, we count
the maximum number of zeros in column x of Q. For this
purpose we note that, using Lemma 1, if node x turns to
gray, it must be at equal distance from seed nodes. On the
other hand, for a given k = 1, 2, . . . , D, the number of
choosing two nodes at distance k from node x (as possible
seed placements which may turn x to gray) is the same as
the number of choosing two nodes among neighbors of x
in G(k), i.e. (dG(k) (x)
2
)
, where dG(k)(x) denotes the degree
of node x in G(k). Thus, the maximum number of zeros in
column x of Q is upper bounded by
∑D
k=1
(dG(k) (x)
2
)
and
hence the number of zeros in Q is bounded from above by∑
x∈V
∑D
k=1
(dG(k) (x)
2
)
. This means that the average number
of ones in each row of Q is at least
Fig. 6. Illustration of the array Q in Theorem 7.
n
(
n
2
)−∑x∈V ∑Dk=1(dG(k) (x)2 )(
n
2
) =n−∑Dk=1∑x∈V (dG(k) (x)2 )(n
2
)
= n+
∑D
k=1
∑
x∈V dG(k)(x)
n(n− 1) −
∑D
k=1
∑
x∈V d
2
G(k)(x)
n(n− 1)
= n+
∑D
k=1 2|E(k)|
n(n− 1) −
∑D
k=1
∑
x∈V d
2
G(k)(x)
n(n− 1)
= n+ 1−
∑D
k=1
∑
x∈V d
2
G(k)(x)
n(n− 1) ,
(6)
where the last equality follows because {E(k)}Dk=1 partitions
all the edges of a complete graph with n nodes. This yields
a lower bound on the maximum social welfare for the case
of two players on the graph.
Finally, using the zero pattern definition of a matrix, we
can compute the last quantity in (6) in the following way.
Let us take AG to be the adjacency matrix of graph G of
diameter D and A = I +AG , where I denotes the identity
matrix of appropriate dimension. It is not hard to see that
σ(Ak)− σ(Ak−1) is the adjacency matrix of G(k). In other
words, AG(k) = σ(Ak) − σ(Ak−1). Therefore, if we let 1
be the column vector of all ones, the degree of each node x
in G(k) can be found easily by looking at the x coordinate
of vector
[
σ(Ak)− σ(Ak−1)]1. Thus we can write
∑
x∈V
D∑
k=1
d2G(k)(x)
=
D∑
k=1
1′
[
σ(Ak)− σ(Ak−1)]′[σ(Ak)− σ(Ak−1)]1
=
D∑
k=1
∥∥ (σ(Ak)− σ(Ak−1))1∥∥2.
Note that the total number of operations needed to com-
pute the expression given in Theorem 7 is at most polynomial
in terms of the number of nodes in the graph.
Definition 6: Given a set Ω, a set function f : 2Ω → R is
called a sub-modular function if for any two subsets S, S¯ ⊆
Ω with S ⊆ S¯ and any x ∈ Ω \ S¯, we have
f(S ∪ {x})− f(S) ≥ f(S¯ ∪ {x})− f(S¯).
In fact, the following example which is due to Esther
Galbrun shows that the sub-modular property does not hold
for the diffusion game model introduced in Section II.
Example 1: [A Counterexample by Esther Galbrun] In
this example, there are two players red (r) and blue (b).
Circled nodes are initial seeds and the graph shows the color
of the nodes at the end of the diffusion. In all cases blue only
picks v3. Moreover, S = ∅ ⊆ {v1} = S¯ and x = {v4}. As it
can be seen in Figure 7, the utility function of the red player
does not satisfy sub-modular property.
Fig. 7. A counterexample for the existence of sub-modular property in the
diffusion game
